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This article presents a model of optimal decentralization of economic governance. It focuses on the
provision of public input for private production. It considers that the decision power is given to a local
government if it has the full right to decide new investments and new taxes to ﬁnance it. Three economic
forces act on this optimal decentralization of the decision. First is the centripetal force which consists in
the increasing accuracy and relevance of public investments when decided more locally. The second and
third are the centrifugal forces of the administrative costs on the one hand and of the ﬁscal competition
among decentralized jurisdictions on the other. Formal proofs of the existence and uniqueness of solutions
are given under special hypotheses and in general. Numerical analysis is also done to understand the
impact on the optimal decentralization level of the diﬀerent model parameters.
keyword: Decentralization; Corporate taxes; Tax competition; Public input; Firm location.
JEL classiﬁcation: H25; H72; R12; R51; R53.
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11 Introduction
Decentralization of economic governance is a key question for states and both decentralization and cen-
tralization of competences occurred in developed countries in the past few decades. France has begun a
decentralization second run in 2003, after a ﬁrst run in 1982 and 1983, that transferred administration pre-
rogatives from central states to r´ egions and d´ epartements. At the same time, central government incited
municipalities to unite in Pubic Inter-Municipal Cooperation Bodies. In the United States, the Indiana
state legislature instituted in 1970 “Unigov” as the Indianapolis consolidated city-county government. In
Canada, there has been various municipality mergers around Winnipeg in 1971, around Toronto in 1998,
around Ottawa in 2001 and of Montreal island in 2002. These opposite changes highlight the trade-oﬀ be-
tween centralization and decentralization forces: merging local governments generates economies of scale
in terms of management costs; on the other hand allowing public investment to be decided closer to the
eﬀective needs generates eﬃciency gains.
According to the Oates (1972) decentralization theorem, decentralized provision of public goods is
always better than uniform provision of public good when there are no spillovers. Decentralized provision
is also better than non-uniform centralized provision if asymmetrical information make the central state
unable to know perfectly local needs. On that matter, Barankay and Lockwood (2007) tested the eﬃciency
of decentralizing the provision of education through the Swiss cantons and actually found eﬃciency gains
in decentralization.
The aim of the present paper is to characterize the optimal local government that should receive
the competence of investing in public input for private production. I consider only the decentralization
of competences among potentially already existing local governments. As presented by Arzaghi and
Hendersen (2005) almost all countries have a large number of embedded administrative divisions with
diﬀerent competences and real power. Therefore, I do not consider vertical interactions between diﬀerent
decentralized levels of a federalist system. These vertical interactions are assumed dependent on the other
competences and independent on the very competence I analyze. Consequently, three forces remain that
incitate to centralize or decentralize the decision of investing in public input for public production. The
centripetal force ﬁrst: public investments are more accurate and more relevant when they are decided
more locally. The reasons of this force are close to the arguments of the decentralization theorem. On the
opposite side, there are two centrifugal forces. First, the administrative costs are increasing with respect
to decentralization, since there are administrative economies of scale in economic governance. Second,
ﬁscal competition among decentralized jurisdictions - and the ﬁscal cost of this competition - is increasing
with respect to decentralization. Indeed, in order to keep the real decision about public investment, local
governments should have the real power to ﬁnance it. As proposed by Schwab and Oates (1991), I consider
a local corporate tax to ﬁnance public expenses for corporate activities. Local governments may therefore
compete on public input and corporate tax rates to attract ﬁrms, and the bias towards low local corporate
tax rates is stronger for small territorial jurisdictions than for bigger ones (Bucovetski, 1991; Wilson, 1991;
2Carbonnier, 2008).
The resolution of this model shows that there exists a unique optimal level for decentralizing the public
input provision competence. This level is not modiﬁed by the actual productivity of public capital in the
private production function, but is strongly impacted by the ratio of the GDP to the cost of administrating
such competence. Therefore, the optimal level for decentralizing this competence is increasing with respect
to productivity gains in administration but decreasing with respect to the complexity of public input needs.
Some papers compare beneﬁts and costs of decentralization in terms of welfare linked to public good
provisions. Such papers, as Alesina and Spolaore (1997) are based on the model presented by Tiebout
(1956). People migrate in order to settle in territorial jurisdictions inhabited by people with the same
tastes for public goods. This model assumes the perfect mobility of households and therefore their identical
welfare at equilibrium. However, Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) noted that the mobility of households is
imperfect, strongly in Europe but also in the United States. Concerning mobility, Oates (1999) has stated
that the decentralization theorem does not rely on the perfect mobility assumption. Welfare is improved by
decentralization as soon as the sums of marginal utilities for public goods are diﬀerent between localities.
Instead, mobility may even worsen the equilibrium state because of competition among local governments.
Panizza (1999) endogenized decisions of decentralization in a political model considering that central
governments choose the level of decentralization in order to maximize their own objective function.
The papers just mentionned study decentralization of the provision of public good for the consumption
of households. However, a similar question is coming to light for other competences such as provision of
public input for private production. No optimal decentralization model exists concerning public input, but
some papers showed the link between ﬁscal competition and underprovision of public input. Zodrow and
Mieskowski (1986) theoretically demonstrated the bias towards low corporate tax rates. B´ enassy-Qu´ er´ e
et al. (2005) empirically showed at the international level that more taxes and more public input may
lead to a higher amount of foreign direct investment. Bell and Gabe (2004) presented the same results at
the local level. In the reduce form, Thornton (2007) linked decentralization and growth.
These papers demonstrate that an underprovision of public input for private production depends
on ﬁscal competition. The impact of ﬁscal competition on tax rates depends on the size of territorial
jurisdictions, and therefore depends on decentralization. Hence, if decentralization improves the matching
between public input and local needs, it also decreases the amount of public input provided. The aim of
the present paper is to compare these two impacts of decentralization on public input provision.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework combining the three
forces: are presented ﬁrst a model of ﬁscal competition between an arbitrarily high number of territorial
jurisdictions, then the dependence of the eﬃciency of public investment on the level of the decentralization
level, and ﬁnally the dependence of administrative costs on the level of decentralization. Section 3 presents
the formal solutions of the model as well as a numerical analysis and a discussion of the results under
three diﬀerent assumptions: ﬁrst, a case where there is coordination and where no tax competition occurs;
second, a case without administrative costs of decentralizing; and third, a general case. For each case, the
3impacts of model parameters on the optimal level of decentralization are analyzed. Section 4 presents the
concluding comments.
2 Theoretical framework
In order to understand the balance between the diﬀerent consequences of decentralization - and therefore
deﬁning the best decentralized government to which to attribute the competence of public investment -
three models are constituted to represent the three forces. First, the centralization forces are presented
through a model of tax competition among decentralized governments and a function of the administrative
costs depending of the level of decentralization. Then the decentralization force is presented through a
model assuming that the eﬃciency of the public investments increases with respect to decentralization.
2.1 Fiscal competition
The model used to understand the aftermath of ﬁscal competition is based on Zodrow and Mieszkowski
(1986). This kind of model is preferred to the new economic geography ones - and specially Baldwin and
Krugman (2004) based on Krugman (1991) - because it is possible to extend the analysis to more than
two territorial jurisdictions. The asymmetrical eﬀects of tax competition in the new economic geography
models are due to industrial diﬀerences between the two regions considered. The aim of the present paper
is to consider the diﬀerent eﬀects of tax competition depending on the mean size of the administrative
divisions, and therefore their number for a given country. These asymmetrical eﬀects of tax competition -
smaller territorial jurisdictions are weaker and undergo a larger bias toward low tax rates - has been shown
theoretically by Bucovetski (1991) and Wilson (1991). Empirically, the existence of ﬁscal competition
among local governments has been proved by Buettner (2001) and Buettner (2003), and the asymmetrical
eﬀects have been highlighted by Boadway and Hayashi (2001) and Leprince et al. (2007). Furthermore,
agglomerations in the new economic geography models are driven by the increasing returns to scale of the
industrial production function although the present study aims at comparing eﬃciency versus quantity of
public input provision.
Hence, the model of tax competition is derived from Carbonnier (2008), which uses a parametrization
that ﬁts the goals of this paper. The bias on local corporate tax rates - and then on public spending
- due to tax competition is computerized in function of diﬀerent variables, among them the number n
of administrative divisions, which can be arbitrarily high. This parameter n gives obviously the level
of decentralization: for a given global economy, larger n implies smaller local governments. This model
allows to calculate tax competition costs for any level n of decentralization, and the optimal n∗, ﬁnal result
of the global model of decentralization. This n∗ should then be considered not as the exact number of
local governments to be created, but as an indicator of the best existing level of decentralization: regions
or states, counties, cities. The dependence of n∗ on the other parameters allows us to understand which
characteristics of the central country imply more or less need for decentralization.
4At each period t in each administrative division i (i = 1..n), there is a lit ﬁxed factor, kit private
capital and pit public capital. These production factors allow private ﬁrms to produce yit according to the
production function yit = F(kit,lit,pit). The production function used for this model is a Cobb-Douglas





it, with two kinds of capital, private and public. In order to focus on
capital only, lit is implemented as an exogenous parameter. There is a total amount of ﬁxed factor Lt
distributed irregularly among the administrative divisions. This ﬁxed factor could be land or a speciﬁc
advantage for production such as geological or geographical properties. In addition, it could be understood
as the labor force or the number of inhabitants with the assumption that labor force is less mobile than
private capital. The exogenous allocation of the ﬁxed factor indicates the size of the economy of the
administrative divisions and allows us to understand tax competition eﬀects between a large number of
local jurisdiction of diﬀerent sizes.
The public capital is ﬁnanced by local business taxation (Schwab and Oates, 1991). Local government
of administrative division i taxes private capital kit at rate τit and invests the revenue τitkit as public
capital for the following period t + 1. As public capital is depreciating at the rate of δ, the amount
pit of public capital at time t in administrative division i is pit = (1 − δ)pit−1 + τit−1kit−1. In each
administrative division, entrepreneurs borrow private capital, pay local taxes and organize production.
The Cobb-Douglas production function allows us to consider capital as a whole, even if it is invested in
each division by a large number of entrepreneurs. Furthermore, each unit of private capital beneﬁts from
the total amount of public input invested in the jurisdiction.
The objective of local governments is to maximize the welfare of inhabitants. In that way they have
to maximize their employment and income. Given the production function - and lit being an exogenous
parameter - employment and income of inhabitants are maximal if production is maximal. Hence, local
government’s objective should be to maximize the production Yit. To improve productivity and produc-
tion, they can set corporate taxes to ﬁnance investment in public input for private production. When
rates of local corporate tax varies, two phenomena arise vis-` a-vis private capital. First, the total amount
of private capital Kt in the country varies, and second, this remaining private capital Kt is reallocated be-
tween administrative divisions. The global amount of private capital K is both the result of inter-temporal
optimization of agent utility and the result of the international partial mobility of private capital. Con-
sequently, the total amount K of private capital invested in the whole country depends on the private
capital returns. At period t, the impact of tax τit on public capital pit has not occurred yet. Hence, the
elasticity of K with respect to τ does not depend on p. The total capital elasticity with respect to local
corporate tax rate K = −1−τi
ki
∂K
∂τi measures the national overall reaction of private capital to tax rate
changes. Afterward, the total amount of national private capital Kt is allocated among administrative
divisions in such manner that it equalizes the marginal returns of private capital in every administrative
divisions. This corresponds to the assumption that private capital is perfectly mobile inside the national

















Knowing what would be the private capital reallocation, local governments settle local corporate tax
rates. Two ways of resolving this model may be implemented. First, the optimization process may be
done in order to maximize the overall production. It means that local governments cooperate and there
is no tax competition. Second, tax competition may occur and each local government maximizes its own
production, using its own corporate tax rate. This case is implemented by solving the model at Nash
equilibrium. In the ﬁrst case, the cooperation case, the optimal tax rate is settled identically for each city








The optimal rate formula is composed of two diﬀerent terms. The ﬁrst one
γ
α+γ reﬂects the optimal ratio
of private capital ki to public capital pi. In that matter τ∗ is decreasing with respect to α because it
indicates the productivity of private capital in the Cobb-Douglas production function: the more productive
is private capital, the higher is the cost of taxing it. In addition, τ∗ is increasing with respect to γ because
it indicates the productivity of the public capital in the Cobb-Douglas production function: the more
productive is public capital, the higher are the beneﬁts of taxation. As this ﬁrst term represents an
optimal ratio of private capital to public capital, it does not depend on the local jurisdiction size. The
second term 1
1+K is the usual ﬁscal arbitrage between tax rate and tax base.
If the tax base elasticity with respect to the tax rate is large, optimal tax rate is low, and vice versa. If
ﬁscal competition is introduced, the optimization problem for each local government consists in maximizing
its own production, with its own tax rate as the only control variable, given the other tax rates. Tax rate
choices are made according to the local elasticity of private capital ki = −1−τi
ki
∂ki
∂τi. The actual corporate



















As the ﬁrst best optimal tax rate τ∗, the second best optimal tax rate τo
i is increasing with respect to
γ and decreasing with respect to α and k. However, it may be either larger or smaller than the ﬁrst






j=1 f(j) . If the
second best optimal tax rate is lower than the ﬁrst best optimal tax rate - as well as if it is higher -
the diﬀerence between both tax rates is larger if k is further from K. This means that the diﬀerence
between both tax rates is larger if f(i)/
P
j f(j) is lower, and therefore if the territorial jurisdictions in
competition are smaller. Under the hypothesis that K is lower than α
1−α, which is the most probable
hypothesis, the second best optimal tax rate is lower than the ﬁrst best optimal tax rate. Tax competition
is then generating a bias toward low local corporate tax rates. This bias towards low local corporate tax
rates is stronger for smaller jurisdictions than for bigger ones. The reason is that the constraints linked to
6marginal decreasing returns of private capital are less binding if there is a larger ﬁxed factor of production
lit.
2.2 Administrative costs
The second centripetal force is the administrative cost of decentralization. The main idea is that there are
economies of scale in the administration of jurisdictions. With decentralization, some administrative tasks
are made by each jurisdiction independently while in a centralized government they may have been done
only once. Furthermore, the global supply of human administrative competence is limited: the smaller is
the administrative division, the more diﬃcult is the implementation of administrative and technical tasks.
Both arguments imply that the global administrative cost function c(n) is increasing with respect to the
number n of administrative divisions.
In the limit case of constant cost function, no economies of scale exist and the administrative costs
of governing an administrative division depend only on the economic size of the division: the costs of a
centralized administration is the sum of the costs of the decentralized administrations. This may be due
to the needs of hiring administrators at the central level devoted to each region, even in very centralized
countries. At the opposite, Alesina and Spolaore (1997) consider a linear cost function: c(n) = c.n. In
that case, all administrative tasks have to be duplicated when competence is decentralized. It assumes
that the costs of every government, large or small, are the same.
A more subtle modeling may be done considering concave or convex cost functions. The convex
hypothesis appears to be unlikely. It would mean that each small local government has higher costs than
the large central one. If relative administrative costs decrease with respect to the size of the administrated
economy - and therefore c(n) is increasing with respect to n - absolute administrative costs are surely
increasing with the size of the administrated economy - and therefore c(n) is concave. Certainly, there
may be costs due to vertical interactions because of the creation of new level of administrative divisions.
However, creation of new local levels is not considered in the present paper because decentralization
consists only in allocation of competences to existing local governments. Indeed, most countries in the
world, whatever actually centralized or decentralized, are already constituted with a large number of
administrative bodies, with more or less real autonomy and power. For example, the United States are
constituted with the federal level, states, counties, townships and cities. In France there is the national
level, regions, d´ epartements, Public Inter-municipal Cooperation Bodies and municipalities.
The cost function is then assumed to be increasing and concave with respect to the level of decen-
tralization. This means that there are administrative economies of scale but that some local tasks have
to be done separately for each location even in a centralized country. The costs of administrating public
investments for private production are therefore lower if administrated centrally than if administrated
locally for each part of the territory. However, the absolute administrative costs in each division are lower
than the centralized costs for the whole territory. Hence, the administrative cost function is assumed to







This equation presents a cost function such as parameter c gives the administrative costs for the centralized
administration of public input for private production. The cost function c(n) is increasing and concave
with respect to the level n of decentralization. Its rate of increase is controlled with parameter d. The
slope of cost function c(n) with respect to n is increasing with respect to parameter d. It is relevant to
notice that even the relative increase rate of the cost function is increasing with respect to parameter d.
When parameter d tends towards zero, the cost function tends towards the global ﬁxed administrative
costs c(n) = c. When parameter d tends towards inﬁnity, the cost function tends towards the linear cost
function c(n) = c.n.
2.3 Public investment eﬃcency gains
The centrifugal force is the eﬃciency of public investment. It is similar to the explanation given by the
decentralization theorem of Oates (1972) applied to provision of public input for ﬁrms instead of public
goods for households. Local provision of public input for private production is better than centralized
provision when ﬁrms variously located have diﬀerent needs in term of public capital. It may derive
from diﬀerences in the labor force, from geographical speciﬁcities or from an heterogeneous allocation of
industries among the diﬀerent locations. Asymmetrical information is the key notion because local needs
are better known by local governments than by central ones. Some empirical studies try to estimate the
outcome of decentralization. With Swiss data, Barankay and Lockwood (2007) ﬁnd that decentralization
improves the eﬃciency of education.
The eﬃciency gains the decentralization of public investments are modeled by the probability that
the public capital invested ﬁts the local needs and it is, therefore, productive. Consequently, a diﬀerence
is made between actual public capital pi and eﬃcient public capital pe
i. If public investment decisions
are taken optimally, the marginal capital investment leads to an equal increase of eﬃcient public capital:
dpe
i = dpi. If not, the marginal public investment does not change the amount of eﬃcient public capital:
dpe
i = 0. The increasing eﬃciency of public investment with respect to decentralization means that the
probability π for a public investment to be eﬃcient is increasing with respect to the level of decentralization.
The central government does not know the actual local needs and has a lower probability to invest properly.
Decentralized governments are aware of the infrastructures needed by local ﬁrms and their probability of
investing eﬃciently is greater. Hence, the probability π(n) is increasing with respect to the number n
of local jurisdictions in which the global territory is divided. As all the marginal investments of a local
government have the same probability π(n) to be eﬃcient, the global amount of eﬃcient public capital is
pe
i = π(n)pi.
A functional form is used in the optimal decentralization model to implement this probability for a
marginal investment to be eﬃcient. The limit of the probability π(n) when the number of administrative
8divisions tends to inﬁnity should be 1 and the probability for the totally centralized state should be positive:
0 ≤ π(1) < 1. Moreover, the eﬃciency gains due to decentralization should have decreasing returns as
there exists a level of decision where less new information may be collected by increasing decentralization.
Consequently, the probability function should be concave. Equation (5) presents this probability function
π(n).






This function tends to 1 when n tends to inﬁnity. The probability of eﬃcient investment for the central
state depends on the a parameter: π(1) = 1 − a. Hence, parameter a gives the eﬃciency gap between
the fully eﬃcient administration of public investment for private production and the actual eﬃciency of
the fully centralized administration. The rate of increase of the probability of eﬃciency is controlled by
parameter b. A larger parameter b induces that the probability increase rate is larger - with the probability
function very concave - and a lower parameter b means a lower increase rate of the probability function
and less concavity.
3 The optimal decentralization problem
The decentralization problem consists in the choice by the central state of the best administrative level at
which to decentralize the decisions of public investment. In the present model, it consists in determining
the number n of administrative divisions that maximizes wealth in the whole country, knowing that every
production decision - public or private - is made at local level. Therefore, the maximization problem is
given by equation (6).

















































In order to solve this maximization problem, hypotheses have to be assumed. First of all, whatever the
number of administrative divisions chosen, the ﬁxed factor L should be distributed equally among them
because of the decreasing marginal returns of production factors. Hence, all decentralized administrative
divisions are identical at the optimum, and therefore have the same amount of taxes, private capital and
public capital. Thus, function f(i) may be simpliﬁed as f(i)/
P
j f(j) = 1
n. If all cities change their taxes




1−τ and K = K0(1 − τ)K, where
K0 is the total amount of private capital invested with no taxes. Thus, private capital investment in each
jurisdiction is k = K0
n (1 − τ)K. The function to maximize is then given by equation (7).
Y (n) = GDP(n) − c(n)
= An1−α−β−γLβK
α+γ
0 δ−γπ(n)γτγ(1 − τ)α+K(α+γ) − c(n)
(7)
The model aims at comparing eﬀects of tax competition and administrative costs on the one hand and
eﬃciency gains in the other. To focus only on these eﬀects, the production returns to scale are assumed
constant, that is α + β + γ = 1. The optimal tax rate is noted τ∗ (τ∗ = α
α+β) and the actual tax rate








. The maximum potential global production X is the production with the
optimal tax rate and perfectly eﬃcient public capital: it is X = ALβK
α+γ
0 δ−γ(τ∗)γ(1 − τ∗)α+K(α+γ).
Using these notations, the objective function is given by equation (8) and the ﬁrst order condition of that
maximization is given by equation (9). The second order condition implies that the left hand term of
equation (9) should be ﬁrst superior and then inferior to the right hand term of this ﬁrst order condition.





















− c0(n) = 0
(9)
Formally solving that maximization problem proves very diﬃcult. However, it is possible to prove formally
the existence and uniqueness of a solution to that problem. The following subsections present the proofs
of the existence and uniqueness of a solution for three diﬀerent cases. First, the coordination case is
considered, without tax competition nor a bias towards low local corporate tax rates. Second, it is assumed
that the global administrative costs do not depend on the decentralization level. Third, we consider the
general case with both tax competition and administrative cost increase with respect decentralization.
For each case, numerical analyses are performed in order to understand the optimal n dependance on the
diﬀerent parameters of the model.
3.1 Tax coordination between decentralized local governments
Tax coordination may be understood as local governments being only partially autonomous. They choose
in which public infrastructure to invest public funds but they have no control on the resources - the
local corporate tax rate - nor the amount invested. The resources may either be national subsidies or
local corporate taxes, the rates of which are decided centrally. In France, the 2010 reform of local direct
taxation provides this kind of political framework. The taxe professionnelle - a corporate tax collected
by the diﬀerent local governments - has been removed and replaced by national subsidies and a new
corporate tax collected nationally and distributed to local administrations. The consequence is that
B(n) = 1 and B(n)0 = 0, regardless of the amount of n. According to the general ﬁrst order condition (9),
the probability (5) of eﬃciency and the cost function (4), the ﬁrst order condition with tax coordination
10is given by equation (10), with the second order condition being that the left hand term should be ﬁrst




























The right hand term of condition (10) - noted rht1 - is positive and superior to the value of the left hand
term - noted lht1(n) - when n = 1 as soon as the central administrative cost c is small compared to the
potential GDP X. Furthermore, the derivative of the left hand term lht0
1(n) - given by equation (11) is




























As the left hand term is increasing and concave, the optimal level of decentralization is more than propor-
tionally increasing with respect to the ratio X/c. To derive more properties about this unique solution,
numerical solving is implemented. The optimal decentralization levels are calculated with diﬀerent values
of the parameters. Changes in the values of the parameters lead to very large changes in the optimal decen-
tralization level. Figures 1 present therefore the optimal decentralization level in function of the diﬀerent
parameters. Figures 1a and 1b show for diﬀerent public capital productivity γ the optimal decentralization
level as a function of the ratio of the potential GDP X to the cost c of a totally centralized administration
of public investment for private production. In ﬁgure 1c, the optimal number of administrative divisions
depends on the probability function of the eﬃciency of public investments - ie: parameters a and b. The
last ﬁgure, ﬁgure 1d, shows the optimal decentralization level depending on the parameter d controlling
the rate of increase of the administrative costs.
The optimal decentralization level is exponentially increasing with respect to the ratio X/c which
represents the ratio of the economic size of the global country to the costs of the national government to
administrate centrally the investments in public capital for private production (eg: ﬁgures 1a and 1b).
If X/c decreases with respect to the economic size of the country - which means that the administrative
costs of a fully centralized country increase more than proportionally to the country economic size - the
optimal size of administrative divisions increases with respect to the country size. At the opposite, if X/c
increases with respect to the country’s economic size - which means that there exists economies of scale
for the administrative costs of fully centralized countries - the optimal size of administrative divisions may
also decrease with respect to the country economic size.
In addition, the optimal decentralization level increases with respect to the eﬃciency gap a, that is
the diﬀerence between public investment eﬃciency of centralized and fully decentralized administrations
(eg: ﬁgure 1c). It increases more rapidly for smaller b parameter, which means that the slower eﬃciency
increases, the larger is the optimal number of administrative divisions. For fast increasing probability,
2It may be negative for a short range of small n, but soon becomes positive. In that case, and because lht1(1) < rht1,
there is also a unique solution.
11a. Optimal detralization depending on b. Optimal detralization depending on
administrative cost (large scale) administrative cost (Narrow scale)
c. Optimal detralization depending on d. Optimal detralization depending on
the public investment eﬃcency function the administrative cost function
Figure 1: Optimal decentralization in case of ﬁscal coordination between local jurisdiction
a high eﬃciency of public investments is reached with only few - and large - administrative divisions in
charge of public input; therefore, full decentralization is not necessary.
The speed of increase d of administrative costs has a negative inﬂuence on the optimal decentralization
level (eg: ﬁgure 1d). A larger public investment productivity γ delays the negative impact of this d
parameter increase.
3.2 No administrative cost variations
The second simpliﬁed case considers tax competition as a centripetal force, but the function of adminis-
trative costs is assumed constant with respect to the decentralization level. It can be explained by the
12cost of civil servants applying central decisions locally even if there is no decentralization at all. There are
no economies of scale in administrating public input for private production. Hence, the right hand term
of condition (9) is zero, and the ﬁrst order condition of the maximization problem is given by equation
(12), the second order condition being that the left hand term of this condition should be ﬁrst superior







+ [α + k(α + γ)]
τ∗B(n)0
[1 − τ∗B(n)]α+K(α+γ) (12)
The right hand term rht2(n) of equation (12) is equal to formula (13) with ∆ = α
1−α − K and p =
α+K(α+γ). Under reasonable assumptions, p is inferior to 1 and ∆ is strictly positive. In order to have
p superior to unity, K needs to be superior to unity itself, which is very unlikely. The other assumption
is invalidated (∆ < 0) if the bias B(n) of the local corporate tax rate is greater than one, which is the















The denominator of rht2 is positive, increases with respect to n and tends toward inﬁnity when n tends
toward inﬁnity. The numerator decreases with respect to n and the limit Num+∞ when n tends toward
inﬁnity is ∆

(α + γ)1−p(α2 + γ)p −pα(1 − α)]. If taking the assumptions (RTS) that returns to scale
are constant - i.e.: α + β + γ=1 - and (V AS) that the shares of the value added are one third for capital
and two third for labor - i.e.: α = β/2 - Num+∞ is positive whatever the α value if K < 1. Therefore,
rht2(n) becomes positive and then tends toward zero.




b )δ(n) − rht2(n) = 0 (der(n) being ﬁrst positive then
negative) where δ(n) = ln(1 + n





b )δ(n) is positive and tends towards
zero as 1
nln(n)2 and rht2(n) tends toward zero as 1
n2. Therefore, der(n) tends towards zero being positive.
The question is then: is der always positive or not? And if not, is the optimal n∗ ﬁnite?
To answer this question, numerical analysis is made, using the (RTS) and (V AS) assumptions. It
appears that der(n) has a unique maximum - for n = 1 if der(1) is positive. If der(1) is positive, then
der(n) is positive for all n and the optimal level of decentralization is the inﬁnite decentralization. If
der(1) is negative, objective function Y (n) ﬁrst decreases with respect to n then increases towards its
ﬁnite limit Y+∞ when n tends towards inﬁnity; but in that case, Y (1) is always superior to Y+∞ and the
optimal level of decentralization is no decentralization at all. Figure 2 presents the value of this der(n)
function for diﬀerent values of the eﬃciency gap a and gives the diﬀerence between the eﬃciency of public
investment decided at a fully decentralized and a fully centralized level.
It appears out of these numerical analyses that the optimal level of decentralization without admin-
istrative cost of decentralization is the full decentralization when the eﬃciency gap a is not too small.
In ﬁgure 2, the parameter a, which gives the eﬃciency gap, should be inferior to 2% for the completely
centralized administration to be a better decision taker than the completely decentralized administration.
13Figure 2: Objective function derivative in case of no decentralization administrative cost
When doing the same analysis with various values for the other parameters, the trigger value of the ef-
ﬁciency gap a for the centralization dominance over decentralization is close to zero, between 1% and
5%. So small eﬃciency gap parameter a would therefore mean that decentralization generates almost no
eﬃciency gains in terms of public investment. In all cases with very small eﬃciency gap - and even with
quite small a parameter - more decentralization always improves the global net output.
3.3 The general case
The previous subsection allows not only to understand the optimal level of decentralization in the case
of constant administration costs with respect to decentralization but allows also to prove that there
exists a ﬁnite solution for the general case. The ﬁrst order condition of the general case is DER(n) =
GDP(n)der(n)−c0(n) = 0 with DER(n) being ﬁrst positive then negative. In the case of a being not too
small (higher then 0.05 in the worst parametrization), previous section shows that der(n) is positive and
decreases towards 0 as 1
nln(n)2 when n tends towards inﬁnity. As GDP(n) is also positive and increases
towards a ﬁnite limit when n tends towards inﬁnity, GDP(n)der(n) decreases towards 0 as 1
nln(n)2 when
n tends towards inﬁnity. On the other hand, the derivative c0(n) function of the administrative costs is
positive and decreases towards 0 as 1
n, that is at a slower decrease than those of GDP(n)der(n). Therefore,
DER(n) becomes negative at a certain n and stays negative until inﬁnity. Hence, there exists a ﬁnite
solution to that problem.
In order to derive properties of this ﬁnite optimal level of decentralization, numerical analysis is done.
As for previous subsections, the optimal levels of decentralization are calculated for diﬀerent values of
the parameters. Figures 3a and 3b present the variations depending on the productivity γ of the public
capital and the ratio of the potential GDP X to the administrative cost c of the fully centralized decision
14of public investment. Figure 3c presents variations depending on parameters a and b of the probability
function of the public investment eﬃciency. Figures 3d and 3e present variations depending on parameter
d, which gives the increase rate of the administrative costs with respect to decentralization.
Figures 3a and 3b show that the optimal level of decentralization increases exponentially with respect to
the ratio of the potential GDP X to the administrative cost c if public input decisions are fully centralized.
Figure 3c shows that this optimal level of decentralization increases with respect to the eﬃciency gap a
- the diﬀerence of the probability for an investment to be eﬃcient if it is decided at a fully decentralized
level or at a fully centralized level - but it decreases with respect to the increase rate b of this probability.
Figures 3d and 3e show that the optimal level of decentralization decreases strongly with respect to the
rate of increase of the administrative costs with respect to decentralization. Furthermore, ﬁgures 3a, 3b,
3d and 3e show that the optimal level of decentralization depends very weakly on the γ parameter of the
productivity of the eﬃcient public capital in the Cobb-Douglas production function. This dependency is
not only weak but also non monotonous.
4 Concluding comments
Depending on the calibration of the model, resulting optimal levels of decentralization may be very diﬀer-
ent: it goes from n∗ = 1 - administration of the investments of public input for private production fully
centralized - to n = +∞ - administration decentralized as much as possible. However, restricting param-
eters to ranges of likely values decreases the range of resulting optimal level of decentralization. However,
the orders of magnitude may be from 10 to 10,000 with diﬀerent likely values of the parameters. This
range of results is credible. The optimal level of decentralization does not really give any information on
the precise number of administrative divisions, but on the local level of decentralized administrations, it
is most appropriate to acquire competences of public investment for private production, and on the actual
autonomy of these local governments. If the order of magnitude of the optimal level of decentralization is
10, the best level to which to decentralize prerogatives of public investment should be states or regions. If
the order of magnitude is more than 10,000, it should be municipalities or districts. Between those values,
the best level may be urban sprawls or counties.
Hence, one important contribution of this paper is to show that there are no general results concerning
the decentralization of decision of investment in public input for private production. The optimal level may
be very diﬀerent from one country to another, depending on its properties. Therefore, a decentralization
theorem cannot be drawn from the provision of public input for private production as it exists for provision
of public goods for households’ consumption. Especially, there is a trigger value for parameter a, which
gives the eﬃciency gap between a centralized decision and a perfectly eﬃcient decision: should parameter a
be inferior to this trigger value, full centralization dominates every level of decentralization. However, this
trigger value is very low - it depends on the other parameters but is always inferior to 5%. Consequently,
there may be a weak decentralization theorem: should the eﬃciency gap a be not too small - actually the
15a. Optimal decentralization depending b. Optimal decentralization depending
on administrative costs (large scale) on administrative costs (narrow scale)
c. Optimal decentralization depending on the public investment eﬃcency
d. Optimal decentralization depending e. Optimal decentralization depending
on costs increase speed (large scale) on costs increase speed (narrow scale)
Figure 3: Optimal decentralization in the general case
16eﬃciency rate of decision taken by the central state should be inferior to 95% of the full eﬃciency - at
least some decentralization of the decision of investment of public input for private decision is better than
full centralization.
Looking at the dependency of the optimal level n∗ of decentralization on the values of the parameters
of this model, three results were expected. First, n∗ increases with respect to a. This link is obvious as
parameter a gives the eﬃciency gain with decentralization. Second, n∗ decreases with respect to b. If
parameter b is larger, the probability for public investment to be eﬃcient increases faster for small n and
a high eﬃciency of decisions is quickly attained when decentralizing: a deep decentralization is thus not
needed. Third, n∗ decreases strongly with respect to d: d gives the absolute and relative increase rate of
administrative costs with respect to decentralization: the larger is d, the more costly is decentralization
and the less decentralized is the decision of public investment at optimum.
However, two of the main results may appear paradoxical. First, parameter γ - giving the produc-
tivity of the eﬃcient public capital in the Cobb-Douglas production function - has little impact on the
optimal level of decentralization. Indeed, in numerical analyses, the curves of the optimal levels n∗ of
decentralization for the diﬀerent values of parameter γ are indistinguishable the ones from the others. It
is quite paradoxical since parameter γ accounts for the productivity of the eﬃcient public capital: de-
centralization is needed in order to increase the eﬃciency of public capital because the eﬃcient public
capital is productive. Thus, productivity of public input should matter. However, this result may be
intuitively understood. The marginal production losses at centralizing or decentralizing - and therefore
the optimal level of decentralization - are due to an amount of eﬃcient public capital smaller than the
optimal amount. The marginal losses of decentralization are due to tax competition and the marginal
losses of centralization are due to ineﬃcient investments. If γ increases, the marginal productivity of
eﬃcient public capital increases for every amount of eﬃcient public capital. But the optimal amount of
eﬃcient public capital also increases, so its productivity decreases because of the decreasing factorial re-
turns of the Cobb-Douglas production function. Hence, the actual marginal productivities of the optimal
eﬃcient public capital are close to each other for diﬀerent values of γ, and therefore for diﬀerent amounts
of optimal eﬃcient public capital. The optimal levels of decentralization, equaling the marginal impacts
on production of centralization and decentralization forces, are therefore close to each other for diﬀerent
values of parameter γ.
Second, the optimal level of decentralization increases more than proportionally with respect to the
ratio of the potential GDP X of the country to the costs c for the fully centralized country to administrate
investments of public input for private production. This means that the sizes of the optimal administrative
divisions may either increase or decrease with respect to the economic size of the country. It depends on
whether the administrative costs c of a fully centralized country are larger or smaller than proportional
to its economic size as measured by its potential GDP X. If there are economies of scale in a central
administration of investments of public input for private production, the administrative costs c of a
fully centralized country are less than proportional to its economic size X. Thus, the optimal level of
17decentralization increases more than proportionally with respect to the economic size X of the country.
Indeed, the central government of a larger country is further from the local needs in matter of public
investments and therefore suﬀers more from centralization. In addition, as the function of administrative
costs increases less and less with respect to decentralization, marginal decentralization is less costly for
larger countries as there are more administrative divisions.
However, the dependency between economic growth and decentralization may depend on the reasons
of the potential GDP X increase. Mainly, it may increase because the ﬁxed factor L increases, because
the potential private capital K0 increases or because the total factor productivity A increases. If economic
growth is driven by population growth or settlement in new territories (an increase of L), administrative
costs c of public input may also increase widely and ratio X/c may increase little or even decrease. In that
case, the increase of the potential GDP X may result in no additional decentralization. If economic growth
is driven by private capital accumulation (an increase of K0), there is no reason why c should increase
substantially. In that case, the increase of potential GDP X should result in an important decentralization.
It appears then that Solovian growth should be accompanied with a signiﬁcant decentralization of the
administration of public input for private production. Last, if economic growth is driven by technological
progress (an increase of the total factor productivity A), there should not be either substantial c changes
and it should lead to more decentralization. However, if this increase of A implies an higher need for private
and public capital adaptation - and therefore more expertise in administrating investment of public input
for private production - the increase of the administrative costs c may be suﬃcient to compensate the
increase of the potential GDP X. In that case, economic growth driven by technological progress may
result in no additional decentralization or even in partial centralization of the administration of public
input for private production.
In France, as in other countries, both decentralization and centralization occurred during the last
decades. Local governments acquired more autonomy in the administration of public input for private
production. In parallel, mergers of small administrative divisions have been encouraged, with both trans-
fers of competency concerning public input and setting of local corporate tax from the municipalities to
Public Inter-municipal administration Bodies. It results in a partial centralization of this competency.
In addition, one may think that the solution may be to keep only the beneﬁts of decentralization and
forgive the costs. It seems possible if investment decision of public input for private production are taken
by decentralized governments but ﬁnanced by the central authority. It is approximately what has been
tried in France with the 2009 reform of the taxe professionnelle. This local corporate tax was mainly
used by French local governments to ﬁnance investments in public input for private production, but it
was distorsive (e.g.: Carbonnier, 2008). The local corporate tax has been replaced by national subsidies
and a corporate tax based on value added was collected at the central level and then distributed to local
governments. In 2010, due to constraints in the public ﬁnances of the central government, it has been
announced that all these transfers from the national government to the local governments will be frozen for
at least three years. Consequently, it will be particularly diﬃcult for a local government facing important
18new needs the forthcoming years in terms of public input to actually invest in them. Hence, it appears that
not having authority on their own resources limits the actual autonomy of local governments. Indeed,
actual decentralization should be both decentralization of competency and collection of the resources,
which limits the optimal level of decentralization.
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